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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 960143-CA
vs.
Priority No. 2

BRUCE DISCHILLIE#
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OP THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(1992 as Amended) whereby a defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital
felony.

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether prosecution was barred in this case on grounds

of double jeopardy because an administrative hearing was
conducted previously where a finding of culpability had been
made, restitution had been ordered, and a penalty imposed?
Constitutional issues are reviewed for "correctness.11

State v.

Davis. 273 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 9/21/95) (citations
omitted).

1

This issue was preserved in a written Motion to Dismiss (R.
25-38).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Amendment V
See Addenda at Tab 1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 35-4-104 (1994)
(1)(a) Any person who makes a false statement or
representation knowing it to be false or knowingly fails to
disclose a material fact, to obtain or increase any benefit
or other payment under this chapter or under the
Unemployment Compensation Law of any state or the Federal
Government, either for himself or for any other person, is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-204 and 76-3-301, a
fine imposed under Subsection (1) shall not be less than
$50, and a penalty of imprisonment shall be for not longer
than 60 days.
(c) Each false statement or representation or failure to
disclose a material fact constitutes a separate offense.

STATEMENT OP THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Bruce Dischillie appeals from a M guilty M plea of three
counts of Fraudulently Obtaining Unemployment Compensation, class
A misdemeanors, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 35-4104 (1994).
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court

Dischillie was charged by Information with twenty-three
counts of Fraudulently Obtaining Unemployment Compensation, class
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A misdemeanors, in Fourth Circuit Court on or about November 9,
1994 (R. 1-8). On November 27, 1995, Dischillie plead "guilty11
to three counts and the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 19).
On December 17, 1995, Dischillie filed a Motion to Dismiss
with the trial court requesting that the convictions be dismissed
on grounds of double jeopardy because an administrative hearing
had previously been conducted and a punishment imposed (R. 2538).

Provo City filed a memorandum in response on December 22,

1995 (R. 40-58).

On December 28, 1995, Dischillie#s motion was

denied by the trial court (R. 59).
On February 5, 1996, Dischillie was sentenced to the
statutory maximum fines and term of imprisonment; and all but 10
days in the Utah County Jail was suspended upon the completion of
36 months formal probation and upon the payment of restitution
(R. 60). On February 28, 1996, a Notice of Appeal was filed in
Fourth Circuit Court-Provo Department and this appeal followed
(R. 62).

8TATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Dischillie was charged with twenty-three counts of
Fraudulently Obtaining Unemployment Compensation covering
unemployment payments allegedly received on a weekly basis
between July 24, 1993, and January 1, 1994. The Information in
this case was filed on November 9, 1994 (Vernon F. Romney, Deputy
Provo City Attorney appeared in this matter as a deputy Utah
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County Attorney).

The total amount of all the allegedly

fraudulent overpayments to Dischillie was $5,474.00.
Prior to issuance of the criminal Information a hearing was
conducted before Sandra Williams, Hearing Officer, at the
Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Unemployment
Security.

A decision and a corrected decision were thereafter

entered by Williams.

The corrected decision contained, inter

alia, contained the following provision:
[Bruce Dischillie] is required to pay an overpayment in
the amount of $5,474.00 and a penalty in the amount of
$5,474.00 totalling $10,948 before being eligible for
waiting week credit or future unemployment benefits.
The overpayment in the amount of $10,948.00 is due and
payable immediately and is to be made to:
Utah Unemployment Compensation Fund
Collections, Third Floor
140 East 300 South, P.O. Box 11800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
On November 27, 1995, Dischillie plead "guilty" to three
counts and the remaining charges were dismissed (R. 19). On
December 17, 1995, Dischillie filed a Motion to Dismiss with the
trial court requesting that the convictions be dismissed on
grounds of double jeopardy because an administrative hearing had
previously been conducted and a punishment rendered (R. 25-38).
Provo City filed a memorandum in response on December 22, 1995
(R. 40-58).

On December 28, 1995, Dischillie's motion was denied

by the trial court (R. 59).
On February 5, 1996, Dischillie was sentenced to the
statutory maximum fines and terms of imprisonment; and all but 10
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days in the Utah County Jail was suspended upon the completion of
36 months formal probation and upon the payment of restitution
(R. 60).

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects individuals against efforts
by the State to impose punishment for the same offense in two or
more separate proceedings.

In this case, Dischillie was punished

twice, in two separate proceedings, for the offense of obtaining
a non-entitled increase in unemployment benefits based upon a
false statement or misrepresentation.

He was punished in an

administrative hearing and in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
Because the administrative penalty constitutes "punishment11,
because both proceedings were based upon the "same offense", and
because both proceedings were "separate", the Double Jeopardy
Clause applies and the criminal trial court erred in finding that
it did not apply and that the criminal prosecution was not
barred.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION WAS NOT BARRED BY THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE

5

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no person shall Mbe subject for the same offense to
be twice put in jeopardy.w

In other words, individuals are

protected against efforts to impose punishment for the same
offense in two or more separate proceedings.

See United States

v. Haloer. 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1988) (citations omitted).

M

The

basis of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy
is that a person shall not be harassed by successive trials; that
an accused shall not have to marshal the resources and energies
necessary for his defense more than once for the same alleged
criminal acts.w

Abbate v. United States. 359 U.S. 187, 198-99,

79 S.Ct. 666, 672-73 (1959).
Dischillie asserts that this matter clearly implicates a
"double jeopardy" analysis which should be reviewed by this Court
for "correctness11.

Pursuant to the Administrative Rules

promulgated by the Utah Department of Unemployment, Dischillie,
at an administrative hearing, was found culpable for
overcompensation of unemployment benefits, was ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of the overpayment ($5,474.00), and was
ordered to pay an additional penalty in the amount of $5,474. In
addition, Dischillie was subsequently prosecuted by Utah County
and charged by criminal information for the same activity that
led to the civil penalty.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that one
was "civil" and the other was "criminal".

The State could have

used criminal proceedings against Dischillie to criminally

6

penalize him and order restitution.
53-3-220(1)(a).

See Utah Code Ann. Section

The State, however, did not initially choose

this route and conducted an administrative hearing instead where
Dischillie was found culpable, restitution was ordered, and an
addiional penalty was imposed.

Only after the administrative

proceeding did the State seek to criminally punish Dischillie.
The test for whether the multiple actions brought by the
State against Dischillie constituted a violation of the Fifth
Amendment is three-pronged:

One, did the administrative penalty

imposed by the Utah Department of Unemployment Security
constitute "punishmentM?

See United States v. Haloer, 490 U.S.

at 435-36, 109 S.Ct. at 1895. Two, were the administrative
hearing and the criminal proceeding arise out of the same
activity?

Three, were both proceedings "separate actions".

United States v. Urserv. 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Millan. 2 F.3d 17, 19 (2nd Cir 1993); State v. Davis,
273 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 9/21/95).
A.

The Administrative Penalty imposed in this case
constituted Punishment.

The first question which must be addressed in this case is
whether the administrative penalty, assessed pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Section 53-3-223, constitutes "punishment11 for
purposes of double jeopardy.

See U.S. v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536,

540 (10th Cir. 1994).
In United States v. Haloer. 409 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892
(1989), the Supreme Court ruled that "the labels 'criminal' and
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civil' are not of paramount importance" in determining whether a

sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Moreover, the "notion of punishment, as we understand it, cuts
across the division between the civil and the criminal law, and
for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constiutes
multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause,...."
Id. at 447-48, 109 S.Ct. at 1901. Therefore, the double jeopardy
clause may be implicated in cases such as this where a civil
punishment and a criminal penalty have been imposed.
Based upon the above reasoning, the Supreme Court formulated
a test to determine if a sanction constitutes "punishment11 in a
double jeopardy context:
A civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve
a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving eiher retributive or deterrent purposes, is
punishment, as we have come to understand the term.
Haloer. 409 U.S. at 448; 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Cf., State v. 392
South 600 East. Neohi. Utah. 886 P.2d 534, 540-41 (Utah 1994).

However, the Halper court limited its ruling to "rare cases"
where a civil penalty "bears no relation to the goal of
compensating the government for its loss[.]"

Halper, 409 U.S. at

449; 109 S.Ct. at 1902.
Dischillie asserts that this case is a "rare case" to which
the Halper analysis was designed to apply.

Here, Dischillie, at

an adiminstrative hearing, was found to have been overcompensated
$5,474.00 in unemployment benefits.

In addition, the

administrative hearing officer also ordered him to pay a
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••penalty" of $5,474.00. This penalty was not to compensate the
government for its loss as required by Haloer.

Rather, the

penalty—which equalled the amount of the overpayment—bore no
relationship to the costs borne by the government, but was
imposed for purposes of retribution and deterrence.

Accordingly,

while the ordered repayment was remedial, the imposed penalty
cannot be said to be "solely remedial" and must be considered as
"punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

B.

Both the Administrative and Criminal proceedings were
based on the same offense.

The second requirement for establishing whether multiple
government proceedings constitute double jeopardy is that both
proceedings must be based upon the same offense.

The standard

for determining whether two actions constitute the "same offense"
is whether "each offense contains an element not contained in the
other."

United States v. Dixon. 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856 (1993);

Blockburaer v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).

The

alleged offense in both the adiminstrative and the criminal
proceedings was whether a false statement or representation by
Dischillie allowed him to obtain an increase in unemployment
benefits for which he was not eligible. Accordingly, both
proceedings were identical and based entirely upon the same
offense.

C.

The Administrative penalty and the Criminal penalty
were imposed in separate proceedings.

9

The final prong of the test to determine if the multiple
actions brought by the State against Dischillie constituted a
violation of the Fifth Amendment is whether the proceedings were
••separate actions". United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 575
(6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Millan. 2 F.3d 17, 19 (2nd Cir
1993); State v. Davis. 273 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 1995).
If the proceedings were "separate" then double jeopardy attaches
upon a finding of culpability in the first proceeding.
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Davis.
(Utah App. 1995), adopted the Ninth Circuit's method of
determining whether two proceedings were separate.

See United

States v. S405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir.
1994), amended bv 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995).

The Davis court

concluded that proceedings which were "initiated separately. . .
at different times before different judges, which result in
separate judgments against the defendant" could not be considered
the same proceeding.

Davis. at 19-20.

In this case, like the proceedings at stake in Davis. the
administrative proceeding was initiated separately by a different
State agency, it was conducted at a different time and before a
different factfinder, and it was resolved by a separate judgment.
In addition, the administrative hearing had been held, and the
administrative judgment (which included restitution and
retributive penalty) had been entered, prior to the filing of the
Criminal Information in November of 1994. Accordingly, this
Court should find that the administrative and criminal

10

proceedings were separate and that the double jeopardy clause
applies In thi s case. '
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Because the administrative judgment constituted
"punishment", because I lie idin i nist. rat i ve and I lies < i iml 11 a 1
proceedings were based upon the same offense, and because both
proceedings were "separate/1 Dischillie asks this Court to
reverse his criminal convictions because criminal prosemt" inn was
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
DATED this p3Qf

day of November, 1996.

Thomas H. Means
Attorney for Dischillie

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 hereby certify that i ir.iii I r».1, postage prepa i J, ( t\ I 1 <i< a iJ
correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to Rick Romney,
Deputy Provo City Attorney, P.O. Box 1849, Provo, Utah 84603 this
day ol: November, 1996.
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ADDENDA
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Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMEN1
[Trial by j u r y in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT

\' Ill

[Bail — Punishment.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.

20

THOMAS H. MEANS (2222)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT, & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
Telephone: 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - PROVO DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CITY OF PROVO

MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,

Case No. 941002383 MC

BRUCE DESCHTLLBE
Defendant.

JUDGE: STEVEN L. HANSEN

Comes now Defendant by and through his attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, who
hereby respectfully moves this court to dismiss this action with prejudice Support lor this
Motion is set forth in the accompanying-Memorandum of points and authorities.
Dated this / / day of

Qy/C

, 199^

Thomas HfMeans
Attorney for Defendant

THOMAS H. MEANS (2222)
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT, & ESPLIN
Attorneys for Defendant
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, UT 84603-0200
Telephone: 373-4912
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - PROVO DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CITY OF PROVO

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
:
v.

Case No. 941001379 TC

:

BRUCE DESCHELLEE
Defendant.

:
:

Judge: Steven L. Hansen

Defendant hereby respectfully submits the following points and authorities in support of
his Motion to Dismiss:

1. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ARGUMENT
One of the most basic elements of the Double Jeopardy Clause is the protection it grants
against successive prosecutions—that is, against efforts to impose punishment for the same offense
in two or more separate proceedings. United States v. Halper. 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1988) (citing
Ex parte Lange. 19 Wall. 163, 168 (1874), see also U.S. v. $405.089.23 U.S. Currency. 33 F.3d
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1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1994). This protection applies equally whether thefirstproceeding resulted
in an acquittal or a conviction. See Burks v. United States. 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150, 57
L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Brown v. Ohio. 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).
Furthettiiun,-, "the buMS ol'ihe Fil'lh 'Viiicinlniriil prol<vtion against double jeopardy is that a
person shall not be harassed by successive trials; that an accused shall not have to marshal the
resources and energies necessary for his defense more than once foi the same alleged ci iminal
acts." Abbatev. United States. 359 U.S. 187, 198-99, 79 S.Ct. 666, 672-73, 3 L.Ed.2d 729
(1959). This principle is "deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurispn

o." Green v. United States. 355 U.S. 184, 187, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199

(1957). In fact, its roots trace back to Greek and Roman times, and can be "ranked as
fundamental." Bartkus v. Illinois. 359 U.S. 121, 151-52, 79 S.Ct. 676, 695-96, 3 I .Ed 2d 684
(1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
The present case clearly implicates a Double Jeopardy analysis and review. Pursuant to
the Administrative rules promulgated by the Utah Department of Unemployment, the claimant
was assessed an administrative penalty in the amount of $5,474.00. The claimant is now subjecct
In ,i itiiiiiiidi proceeding which is based on the same activity thai ln( to the civil penalty and which
seeks punishment for the violation of identical laws. The only difference between the two
proceedings is the form of punishment sought by the government. The government could have
used criminal proceedings to fine Mr. Deschillie and criminally punish him. Utah Code Ann. §
53-3-220(l)(a). The government, however, did not attempt to accomplish its goal within the
same proceeding. Rather, it seeks to acheive its goal in two proceedings, thereby denying the
right of Mr. Deschillie from "being able, once and for all, to conclude [his] confrontation with
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society" at the time of the jury's verdict. United States v. Jorn. 400 U.S. 479, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547,
558, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).
To determine whether the actions of the government constitute a violation of the Fifth
Amendment, three questions must be answered: do administrative penalties promulgated by Utah
Department of Employment Security constitute "punishment;1" are the administrative proceedings
and the criminal proceeding based on the same offense, andfinally,do both proceedings constitute
separate actions? United States v. Urserv. No. 94-1127, 1995 FED. App. 0209P at 5 (6th Cir.
July 13 1995), United States v. Millan. 2 F.3d 17, 19 (2nd Cir. 1993), State v. Davis. 273 Ut.
Adv. Rep. 18, page 2, (Ut. Ct. App., 1995) (Stating that only two of the three must be answered).
2.
IF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY HAS ANY RETRIBUTIVE OR
DETERRENT EFFECT- IT IS PUNISHMENT.
Because it is clear that the criminal information seeks to punish Mr. Deschillie, we must
determine whether civil sanctions imposed, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §53-3-223, are
"punishment" for purposes of double jeopardy. See, U.S. v. Hudson. 14 F.3d 536, 540 (10th Cir.
1994).
In United States v. Halper. 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), the
Court ruled that "the labels 'criminal1 and 'civil1 are not of paramount importance" in determining
whether a sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Furthermore, "the
notion of punishment, as we understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the
criminal law, and for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes multiple
punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy clause,...." Id, at 447-48, 109 S.Ct. at 1901. Thus,

United States v. Halper. 490 U.S., at 435, 436, 109 S.Ct., 1892, 1895 (1989).
3

the Court recognized that one can be punished both civilly and ei imii tally for double jeopai d)
purposes.

Based on this reasoning, the Courtformulateda test to determine if a sanction results in
"punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause: "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can <m\\ be explained J,S als*»sen iiig eil her
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term." Id, at
448, 109 S.Ct. at 1902 (emphasis added).2 The Halper court limited its decision to the "rare
case" w here a ci\ il peiia.lt:> "bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the government
for its loss[.]" Id, 409 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502. In the case, at hand,
the civil penalty is the same amount of tl le alleged overpayment of $5,474.00. The administrative
penalty bears no relationship to the costs borne by the government as required by Halper, but
rather the alleged overpayment is doubled toseek retribution and to penalize Mr. Deschillie
the administrative penalties assessed were "soley" remedial, they would be structured to follow
the costs incurred on behalf of the agency and would be similar in each case.
Significantly, the Supreme Court better defined the scope of v hat constiti ites "punishment"
in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. —, 125 L.Ed.2d 448. See also, Davis, at page
#7 (stating that Austin cleared up any confusion regarding what is punishment for Double
Jeopardy purposes). Austin emphasized that a sanction which serves any purpose, other than a
solely remedial one, is punishment. Austin, 509 U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2812, 125 L.Ed.2d at

2

See also State v. 392 South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d 534, 540-41 (Utah 1994),
Davis, at *5.
4

505. The Austin Court reemphasized the Halper ruling by holding that a sanction which is
designed even in part to deter or punish will constitute punishment, regardless of whether it also
has a remedial purpose. See Austin v. United States. —U.S. —, — , —, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2806,
2812, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, 498, 505 (1993).
The Utah Court of Appeals has also followed the reasoning in Austin ruling that "Austin
distinctly emphasized that even if criminal fines, civil penalties, or civil forfeitures have remedial
purposes, if they have any punitive objectives, they are subject to constitutional restraints." Davis,
at page #7.
It has been argued that the specific holding in Austin deals with the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause and not the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. While this is
true, in determining whether the Excessive Fines Clause applied to the facts in Austin, the
Supreme Court was forced to determine whether a civil fines constituted "punishment." Quoting
Halper. the Court stated that a statute that does not serve only a remedial purpose can only be
explained as being punishment. Austin, at 505. The only fair reading of Austin is that it resolved
the issue of how to define "punishment" in both the Excessive Fines Clause and the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Davis, at page #7. see also U.S. Currency, at 1219.
The Tenth Circuit also supported this reasoning. United States v. Hudson. 14 F.3d 536,
540 (10th Cir. 1994). Citing Halper and Austin, the Tenth Circuit stated that "unless a sanction is
'solely1 remedial, i.e., not serving deterrent or retributive ends, it is punishment." Id The court
found the "common sense" of this doctrine especially persuasive:
"That is to say, if a particular remedial sanction can only be understood as also
serving punitive goals, then the person subjected to the sanction has been punished
despite the fact that the sanction is also remedial. To conclude otherwise
5

effectively invalidates the Double Jeopardy Clause by allowing multiple
punishments for the same conduct merely because the punishments also serve
remedial purposes. We therefore must conclude that if a sanction is not
exclusively remedial, but rather can only be explained as also affecting deterrence
or retribution, it is punishment for double jeopardy analysis. We are careful to
note that a determination that a sanction is at least in part punishment requires that
it must be explained as also serving as a deterrent or retribution, not merely that it
may be so explained." IdL
Thus, the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, the Utah Court of
Appeals am! flie Tenth Circuit have determined that a sanction that has any aspect of deterrence
or retribution must be punishment for double jeopardy purposes. In still another case, the United
States Supreme Court again upheld its reasoning: "Criminal fines, civil penalties, civil forfeitures,
and taxes all share certain features: They generate government revenues, impose fiscal burdens on
individuals, and deter certain behavior." Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch,
I M S (I 1 ,lM 7, 1Q4? 11W4) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court made it explicitly clear that civil
penalties are deterrent in nature. The United States Supreme Court rulings in Halper. Austin, and
Kurth Ranch, and the Utah courts and Tenth Circuit rulings in Davis, and Hudson make it clear
that civil fines and penalties which are deterrent in nature constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. This is particulary significant when the administrative penalty increases to
equal the amount in benefits obtain fraudulently.
While most cases arising out of a Halper-Austin analysis involve situations where a
criminal conviction preceded in .iiimipi tn impose civil sanctions, prior exactions of civil
sanctions does not alter the applicability of Halper. Davis. 1995 WL 554612 (Utah App.). See
also, U.S. v. Hudson. 14 F.3d 536 (10th Cir. 1994), United States v. BizzelL 921 F.2d 263 (10th
Cir.), U.S. v. Urserv. No. 94-1127, 1995 FED. App. 0209P (6th Cir. July 13 1995).

6

While it is clear that the Department of Employment Security intended the administrative
penalty to have remedial purposes, it is equally clear, that because the penalty is not for a
specified amount, but rather double the alleged overpayment, whatever amount that may be, it is
punitive in nature as well.
3.
THE IMPOSITION OF THE ADMINSTRATIVE PENALTY AND THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS ARE BASED ON THE SAME INCIDENT AND
FACTS ARISING OUT THE SAME OFFENSE.
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects the accusedfrommultiple punishments, in multiple
proceedings, for the same offense. The standard for determining whether two actions constitute
the "same offense" is whether "each offense contains an element not contained in the other."
United States v. Dixon. 113 S.Ct 2849, 2856 (1993), Blockburger v. United States. 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932). An argument has been made in similar cases that the criminal prosecution and
the adminstrative penalty contain elements not contained in the other because the criminal
prosecution seeks redressfromthe person, and the civil proceeding proceeds against the property.
See Ursery, at 10. This argument has been soundly rejected because the administrative penalty
necessarily requires proof of the criminal offense. IdL
4.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTY WAS IMPOSED IN A
SEPARATE PROCEEDING FROM THE CRIMINAL TRIAL FULFILLING A
DOUBLE JEOPARDY REQUIREMENT THAT THE DEFENDANT BE
SUBJECTED TO MULTIPLE PROCEEDINGS.
Substantial case authority clearly demonstrates that the leving of an administrative penalty,
is intended to be a separate proceedingfromany criminal prosecution. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that a parallel civil financial exaction, imposed only on persons arrested for
drug offenses, can count as a separate jeopardy even where it is coordinated with a criminal
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prosecution. Kurth Ranch, at 1948. The assessment of an administrative penalty upon Mr.
Deuschille is a separate and distinct procedurefromthe criminal action of alleged fraudulent
receipt of unemployment compensation and involve[s] a different burden of proof
Most recently, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed this very issue. Davis, at page #1
(Utah App.). This court adopted the Ninth Circuit's U.S. Currency method of determining
whether two proceedings were separate. IcL at page #3. The court failed to see how actions that
were"initiated separately...at different times before different judges, which result in separate
judgments against the defendant" could be considered the same proceeding. Id When a person is
assessed an administrative penalty, it is done before the criminal proceeding commences. These
civil and criminal proceedings are tried before different factfinders, and different burdens of proof
apply.3 They are presided over by different judges (or administarative officers), and resolved by
separate judgments. Furthermore, the defendant is not required to post bond, nor is he under any
legal duty to appear at the administrative hearing. Ballard, at 1305. He cannot befinedor
imprisoned for a failure to appear at the hearing. Id.
Ordinarily, such proceedings are referred to as "parallel proceedings," and not as "separate
proceedings." U.S. Currency, at 1216. A administrative penalty case and a criminal case would
constitute the same proceeding only if they were brought in the same indictment and tried at the
same time. Id This is easily accomplished by observant prosecutors and members of law
enforcement as the very samefineseffected by the administrative suspension can be mandated by
the criminal penalties for a conviction offraudulentreceipt of unemployment insurance benefits.
Therefore, the purposes of the administrative penalty could be carried out without violating the
3

Ballard. at 1305.
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Double Jeopardy Clause. To allow this criminal proceeding to continue subjects Mr. Deschillie to
multiple proceedings which subjects the him to double jeopardy.
Attempts have been made to rename a double jeopardy violation a "single, coordinated
prosecution." The Ninth Circuit has called this attempt to exact successive punishments under the
guise of a "single, coordinated prosecution" one of the "worst abuses of prosecutorial power"
which "harass or exhaust particular defendants."4 The Supreme Court has made it clear that
parallel actions, instituted at the same time and involving the same alleged conduct, constitute
separate proceedings for double jeopardy purposes. See JefFers v. United States. 432 U.S. 137,
97 S.Ct 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit found no reason why two
proceedings should be deemed one when one of the proceedings was a criminal prosecution and
the other was a civil action. U.S. Currency, at 1218. The court concluded that whether or not
two actions are brought in "two separate proceedings" is irrelevant for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause: "a civil... action which is brought and tried separately from a criminal
prosecution and is based upon the same offense constitutes a separate 'proceeding'." Id.
Importantly the Utah Court of Appeals has followed this same reasoning. Davis, at pages #2-3.
In United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17,20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 992
(1994), the Second Circuit found that a civil suit and a criminal prosecution constituted a single

4

The Tenth Circuit shot down a recent attempt to engage in a coordinated campaign of
multiple prosecutions. See United States v. P. HE., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 850-53 (10th Cir. 1992)
(describing the campaign); PHE, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 743 F.Supp 15, 17-20
(D.D.C. 1990) (same). The Tenth Circuit ordered a hearing to determine if the indictment arising
from this scheme should be dismissed on the grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness. See 965
F.2d at 860. The District Court of the District of Columbia issued a preliminary injunction against
further prosecution of the scheme. See 743 F.Supp. at 27.
9

proceeding that did not implicate double jeopardy concerns. In reaching its conclusion, the court
relied heavily on the following facts:
In the instant case warrants for the civil seizures and criminal arrests were issued
on the same day, by the same judge, based on the same affidavit by the DEA agent.
In addition, the Stipulation agreed to by the parties involved not only the seized
properties of the civil suit, but also properties named in the criminal indictment that
were under restraining order. Furthermore, the civil complaint incorporated the
criminal indictment. Finally the [Defendants] were aware of the criminal charges
against them when the entered into the Stipulation. Given these circumstances, we
reach the conclusion that the civil and criminal actions were but different prongs of
a single prosecution of the [Defendants] by the government. 2 F.3d at 20.
In comparison, the only similarity between the case at bar and Millan is that, in both cases, at the
time of the civil proceeding the defendant knew of the pending criminal action. The Sixth Circuit
found that a civil action and criminal prosecution can properly be considered components of a
single proceeding if the facts of the case merit such a decision. Ursery, at 14. The Court,
however, found that the facts of its case did not reveal a single coordinated proceeding. The
court found that there had been no communication between the government's attorneys that
handled the criminal case and those that handled the civil action, the two proceedings were
instigated four months apart, presided over by different judges (or hearing officer), and resolved
by separate judgments. Id Applying the logic of the these courts, this Court shouldfindthe civil
and criminal proceedings are separate for the same reasons noted by the Sixth Circuit in Ursery.
This conclusion that such proceedings are separate actions is consistent with many other
jurisdictions.5 Importantly, the decisions of the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit in U.S. v.
5

People v. Towns, 646 N.E.2d 1366, 1370 (111. App. 2 Dist. 1995)(in possession of
controlled substance case court found that the forfeiture of $2,165 was punishment for double
jeopardy purposes, and that the forfeiture proceeding and the criminal proceeding were separate.
The court also stated that "United States Currency is consistent with the overwhelming majority
of courts across the country which have been confronted with this issue.11). See, e.g., United
10

One Single Family Residence. 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994) finding a single coordinated
proceeding were decided before the important ruling in Kurth Ranch. Because the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that parallel criminal and civil proceedings are separate for double jeopardy
purposes; the Utah Court of Appeals has determined the same in Davis; and, the facts of this case
show that the civil and criminal proceedings were separate, this court should find that the
proceedings were separate for double jeopardy purposes.
CONCLUSION
This court should hold that the administrative penalty hearing put Mr. Deschillie in
jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 12 of the
Utah Constitution, because the three inquiries that must be answered to support a violation of the
Double Jeopardy clause are answered in favor of Mr. Deschillie. First, the U.S. Supreme Court
has made it clear that a civil proceeding can subject a person to punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. The purpose of administrative penalty imposed on Mr. Deschillie is punitive because it
exacts deterrent and retributive sanctions on people arrested for allegedly obtaining
unemployment insurance benefits fraudulently. Second, the civil proceeding was based on the
same offense as the criminal proceedings, because the same facts must be relied upon in both

States v. Torres, (7th Cir. 1994), 28 F.3d 1463; Clift v. Indiana Department of State Revenue.
(Ind.Tx.Ct. 1994), 641 N.E.2d 682 (following Kurth Ranch; controlled substances tax was
punishment for double jeopardy purposes and could not be collected from defendant who had
pleaded guilty to offense); State v. Cadillac DeVille (La.Ct.App.1994), 632 So.2d 1221
(forfeiture of automobile violated double jeopardy clause even though statute served some
remedial purpose, where forfeiture was separate from criminal proceeding (dissent filed)), writ
granted (L2L.1994X 642 So.2d 1302; New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Department v. Whitenen
(App. 1993), 117 N.M. 130, 869 P.2d 829 (drug tax was punishment against double jeopardy
where defendant was convicted and state failed to show tax was remedial (dissent filed), rejecting
Johnson v. State. (Tex.Ct.App. 1994), 882 S.W.2d 17, review granted, which held forfeiture of
personal property was not overwhelmingly disproportionate penalty but instead was remedial).
11

proceedings to convict the accused. Third, the civil and criminal proceedings are "separate" for
double jeopardy purposes. They are tried before different factfinders and judges, on separate
dates, with no cooperation between the prosecutors in the separate proceedings, the defendant's
procedural requirements are different in each of the proceedings, and the separate courts have
different authority to impose sanctions. When viewed as a whole, it is clear that the
administrative penalty hearing placed Mr. Deschillie in jeopardy, under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, barring further criminal prosecution.
Respectfully submitted this ) / day of l Y ^ v f _
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Thomas H. Means
Attorney for Defendant
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Vernon F. Romney (#3949)
Attorney for Plaintiff
Provo City Attorney's Office
351 West Center Street
P.O. Box 1849
Provo, Utah 84603
(801)379-6141
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, PROVO DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PROVO CITY,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 941002383 jtC
Hon. Fred Howard, Judge

BRUCE DESCHILLIE,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the plaintiff, Provo City, and submits the following Memorandum in opposition to
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant, Bruce Deschillie, was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1993). Pursuant to U.C.A. § 53-3-223 (1994) the Defendant's
driver's license was suspended as a consequence of the DUI arrest. The Defendant now moves to dismiss
the DUI charge against him, claiming that to prosecute him would violate the double jeopardy protections
of the federal and state Constitutions. For reasons outlined below, the City respectfully requests that this
Court deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In order for the Defendant's double jeopardy claim to succeed he must show that he
was punished twice, in separate proceedings, for the same offense. If Defendant fails to
establish any one of these facts his double jeopardy claim must fail. This Court must reject
his claim because the Defendant cannot show that he has been punished twice in two
separate proceedings. Indeed, the suspension of one's driving privileges does not constitute
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109
S. Ct. 1892 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court held that civil penalties will be deemed
punishment for double jeopardy purposes only if they cannot rationally be considered
remedial in nature. The Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that the sole purpose of a
driver's license suspension is to protect public safety, not to punish individual drivers. Ballard
v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (1979). Because Halper and Ballard are
controlling precedent in the present case, they compel the conclusion that suspension of a
driver's license is not punishment and can be lawfully imposed in addition to a criminal
prosecution either in the same or separate proceedings.

ARGUMENT
I.

AN ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSION IS A NON-PUNITIVE CIVIL
SANCTION TO WHICH DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTIONS DO NOT ATTACH
The important protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause1 rest on the premise that "a

person shall not be harassed by successive trials [nor be forced] . . . to marshall the resources
and energies necessary for his defense more than once for the same alleged criminal acts."
Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959). Although the Double Jeopardy Clause
*The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that, "Nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. Const. Amend. V.
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mentions only harms to "life or limb," it is well settled that its protections extend to both
criminal and civil penalties. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,

U.S.

, 114 S. Ct.

1937, 1941 fh. 1 (1994). However, an individual may receive two separate sanctions if either
is deemed not to be punishment and multiple punishments may be exacted if imposed in a
single proceeding. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989). The threshold questions
in double jeopardy analysis, therefore, are whether two sanctions being imposed upon a
defendant occur in separate proceedings and whether both constitute "punishment." United
States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994). This Court should
deny the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss because his criminal prosecution will be the first
and only proceeding he faces on this matter and because he has not been, nor will be
punished twice for the same offense.
A.

An Administrative Driver's License Suspension Hearing Does Not Qualify As a
"Proceeding" for Double Jeopardy Purposes

The City does not violate Defendant's double jeopardy rights by pursuing a
subsequent criminal prosecution because the two sanctions are part of a single, coordinated
prosecution. In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989), the Supreme Court
observed that the government may seek both criminal and civil sanctions against a defendant
in a single proceeding. The Court failed to explicitly define "single proceeding," but made it
clear that two actions need not be filed at the same time, in the same court, and proceed
simultaneously in order to qualify as a single proceeding for double jeopardy purposes. The
Halper court stated that its decision was not intended to "prevent the Government from
seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized
criminal penalties in the same proceeding." Id. Given that the Supreme Court was well
aware that federal rules of procedure require that civil and criminal actions be filed and
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docketed separately and that such actions typically proceed at different times and in different
courts, its statement reveals that the Court did not view the simultaneous filing and pursuit
of actions as a necessary characteristic of a "single proceeding." In other words, it defies
reason to suggest that the nation's highest court would expressly encourage a course of action
it new to be technically impossible.
Consequently, several U.S. circuit courts have held that when civil and criminal actions
are pursued contemporaneously they will be deemed to be a single proceeding for double
jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 1993), cert, denied
sub nam., Bottone v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); United States v. One Single Family
Residence Located at 18755 North Bay Road, Miami, 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995). In Millan, for example, the United States filed
both a criminal prosecution and an in rem civil forfeiture action against defendants for
various narcotics offenses. In rejecting the defendants' double jeopardy claim, the Second
Circuit held that because a forfeiture action and a criminal case !lwere but different prongs of
a single prosecution," the United States did not offend the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause. Millan's analysis is helpful to the present case because that court
established the following four specific factors for determining whether civil and criminal
actions are part of a single, coordinated prosecutorial effort:
•

First, a court must determine "when, how, and why the civil and criminal
actions were initiated." Id. at 21.

•

Second, the criminal actions must involve the same conduct.

•

Third, the defendant must be aware of both actions pending against him or
her.

•

Fourth, all parties must recognize that the United States "intended to pursue
r

ft**

all available civil and criminal remedies, regardless of the individual outcome of
any of these claims." Id.
Applying these factors to the case at bar reveals t iat license suspension hearings and
subsequent DUI criminal prosecutions should be viewed is a single, coordinated proceeding.
In regard to the first factor, both actions here were initia ced when it became clear that the
defendant had broken a law and was a threat to other drivers. Thus, there were synchronous
remedial and punitive objectives that could not be accom plished in the same proceeding. In
other words, there is a need to remove a presumptively c angerous driver from the public
highways as quickly as possible, which cannot be done in an overburdened court system
where a DUI case may not come to trial for a year or m« >re. The state legislature made its
intentions clear in this regard when it stated that the lice: ise suspension statute was aimed at
"protecting persons on the highways by quickly removing srom the highways those persons
who have shown they are safety hazards." Utah Code Ai n. § 53-3-222 (1994) (italics added).
This, coupled with the fact that both the civil and crimim 1 sanctions are based on the same
officer's testimony and arrest report underscores why the e two sanctions should be deemed
as part of a single, coordinated proceeding under the firs Millan factorApplication of the second, third, and fourth Millar factors also supports the City's
position. Here, the criminal and civil actions undeniably nvolve the same conduct of driving
a motor vehicle while intoxicated, as the second factor re< juires. The same holds true with
the third factor given that at the time of Defendant's arre st it was made clear to him that he
was to be the focus of a criminal DUI prosecution as wel as an administrative license
suspension determination. Similarly, the fourth factor is s atisfied because all parties have
known that the City intended and to pursue criminal sanctions against the Defendant
regardless of the outcome of the driver's license suspension determination. Indeed, driver's
4

license suspensions are handled exclusively by the State and the City does not concern itself
with the suspension process or outcome in any way. It is widely known that the City
proceeds with its criminal DUI prosecutions irrespective of whether a defendant's license has
been suspended. This is an important point because the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated
that the primary danger with multiple sanctions is that the government may use them to
impose a greater measure of punishment on defendants. In Halper the Court said, tf[T]he
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the possibility that the Government is seeking the
second punishment because it is dissatisfied with the sanction obtained in the first
proceeding." Halper, 435 U.S. at 452 fh. 10. This is clearly not a danger in cases like the
present where the City does not even consider the outcome of a prior administrative hearing
when deciding whether to pursue criminal charges against a defendant. For these reasons,
this Court should view license suspension sanctions and DUI prosecutions as occurring in a
single, coordinated prosecutorial effort and deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

B.

An Administrative Driver's License Suspension Does Not Constitute
Punishment for Double Jeopardy Purposes Because it Serves a Remedial
Purpose

Should this Court conclude that an administrative hearing is a separate proceeding
under the double jeopardy analysis, the Court should still deny Defendant's claim because
suspension of one's driving privileges does not constitute punishment. Defendant argues that
the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense
is violated because he was first punished by having his license suspended and will face a
second punishment by being criminally prosecuted for the same conduct which gave rise to
the suspension sanction. However, Defendant's claim is without merit because an
administrative driver's license suspension does not even trigger double jeopardy protections
5
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given that it serves a purely remedial purpose and a civil sanction is deemed punishment
under the Double Jeopardy Clause only if it is not rationally related to remedial objectives.
In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989), the Supreme Court's seminal
double jeopardy case, the Court made it unmistakably clear that civil sanctions imposed upon
defendants in addition to criminal penalties violate the Double Jeopardy Clause only if they
are deemed to be punishments. In that case the Court was asked to determine whether a
$130,000 fine imposed on a defendant who had defrauded the government out of $585 in
false Medicare claims constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The Halper
court found that the fine was so disproportionate to the defendant's fraud that it could not
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as punishment. The proper analysis for
determining whether a civil sanction is punishment, according to the Court, is to determine
what purpose the sanction can fairly be said to serve. Id. at 450. If the sanction serves a
remedial purpose rather than being so punitive in nature that it can only be reasonably
viewed as a deterrent or retribution, it will not run afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause
when imposed in addition to criminal penalties.
In the present case, Defendant argues that Halper established a "solely remedial" test
which defines "punishment" as any civil sanction that can arguably be viewed as serving a
punitive purpose, however slight. This argument ignores the plain language of Halpefs
holding:
We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already
has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional
civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as
remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.
Id. at 448-49 (italics added). The Court defined punishment in the double jeopardy context,
then, as any sanction that serves no reasonable remedial purpose but is merely a deterrent or
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retribution. Consequently, it is more accurate to say that Halper established a "solely
punitive" test. In support of his claim, Defendant looks to a sentence in Halper immediately
preceding the Court's holding which states that "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment." Id. at 448.
However, not only is this sentence not the express holding of Halper, but Defendant's
interpretation of it is inconsistent with the decision's repeated language to the effect that a
civil sanction need only be "rationally related" and "roughly proportional" to the government's
remedial objectives in order to not be deemed punishment. Id. at 446-52. In other words, if
the Court intended to establish a bright line solely remedial test as Defendant suggests, it
makes no sense that it would employ a rational relationship analysis which imposes a very
low burden for showing that a sanction has remedial qualities. In fact, the Court took the
position that the only time a civil penalty constitutes a second punishment for the same crime
is when the "sanction [is] overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages [a defendant] has
caused." Id. at 449. The Court went on to say that it would be a rare case when a civil
sanction is so disproportionate that it would be deemed punishment. Id. This fact clearly
contradicts Defendant's view that Halper established a bright line solely remedial test because
it would be the typical rather than the rare case when a civil sanction could be shown to have
some punitive effect and thereby be treated as punishment.
Moreover, any doubt that the correct Halper test for making punishment
determinations in the double jeopardy context is not a "solely remedial" test was laid to rest
in the Supreme Court's most recent double jeopardy case. In Department of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch,

U.S.

, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1941 (1994), the Court specifically quoted Halpefs

"solely punitive" language as the holding of that case without ever mentioning the "solely
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remedial" language on which Defendant relies. Defendant cites Austin v. United States,
U.S.

, 113 S. Ct 2801 (1993), pre-Kurth Ranch case, as authority that Halper established a

"solely remedial" test because the Supreme Court said in Austin that a civil sanction that
serves in part to punish will be considered punishment under the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment. However, Defendant's reliance on Austin is misplaced for several
reasons.
First, Austin was an excessive fines case, not a double jeopardy case. The Court made
this point clear in the first sentence of its opinion when it stated,
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment applies to forfeitures of property under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).
We hold that it does and therefore remand the case for consideration of the question
whether the forfeiture at issue was excessive.
Id. at 2803 (italics added).2 Thus, Austin employed an Eighth Amendment excessive fines
punishment analysis that does not apply to the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy analysis.
The Eighth Amendment analysis differs from a Fifth Amendment analysis in that the
objective of the former is to determine whether a properly imposed sanction is excessive,
while the objective of the latter is to determine whether a sanction can be properly imposed
at all. For this reason, the Austin court never stated nor implied that its analysis applies in
the double jeopardy context.
Second, Austin dealt specifically with in rem civil forfeiture of property rather than
addressing civil sanctions generally or forfeiture of a privilege as in the present case. Austin
determined that civil asset forfeitures are partly punitive given the unique history, statutory
language, and Congressional intent associated with such forfeitures. That case says nothing

2

Elsewhere the Court made this point even more clearly when it said, "Since in this case we deal only with the
question whether the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies, we need not address the application of
those tests." Id at 2805 fn.6 (italics added).
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about whether other types of civil sanctions are remedial or punitive, especially not such
sanctions as driver's license suspensions which serve well-recognized public safety objectives
not associated with civil forfeiture sanctions. Moreover, license suspension sanctions differ
dramatically from civil forfeiture sanctions in that defendants have a property interest in the
latter but not the former.
Third, Kurth Ranch, a post-Austin case, not only quotes Halpefs "solely punitive"
language to the exclusion of the "solely remedial" language, but it does not include Austin in
the list of double jeopardy cases it cites and discusses. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct at 1945.
Instead, Kurth Ranch identifies Austin as nothing more than an excessive fines case. The fact
that the Supreme Court was unwilling to apply Austin in the double jeopardy context is
compelling evidence that its members do not believe that Austin plays an important role in its
double jeopardy jurisprudence. It is difficult to believe that the nation's highest court would
fail to discuss Austin in the double jeopardy context if that case drastically modified double
jeopardy analysis in the way that Defendant suggests. Thus, Defendant's claim that Austin
resolved the issue of how to define "punishment" in both excessive fines and double jeopardy
cases disregards the Supreme Court's most recent double jeopardy case and is simply without
merit. Indeed, there can be little doubt that for purposes of double jeopardy, punishment is
defined as any sanction that serves no remedial purpose and can only be characterized as
punitive.
For these reasons, Defendant's reliance on Austin is misplaced. For the same reasons,
Defendant's reliance on United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F3d 1210 (9th Cir.
1994), State v. Davis, 273 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and State v. 392 South
600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d 534 (Utah 1994), is also misplaced. Although $405,089.23
and Davis were double jeopardy cases, they addressed civil forfeiture sanctions exclusively
9

and relied upon Austin to do so.3 Thus, they do not apply to non-forfeiture cases such as the
case at bar. In fact, Davis specifically stated,
We note that this holding is limited to the narrow issue before us: whether the
forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to § 58-37-13(l)(e) amounts to punishment for
double jeopardy purposes. We do not reach the issue of whether forfeiture of . . . a
privilege, such as operating a motor vehicle, constitutes punishment for double
jeopardy purposes.
Davis, at 24 fn. 13. Similarly, 392 South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, is not a double jeopardy case
but is an Eighth Amendment civil forfeiture case that applies only to an excessive fines
analysis.
Defendant's reliance on United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536 (10th Cir. 1994), is
similarly misplaced. He cites Hudson for the notion that Halper and Austin establish a solely
remedial test that defines punishment as any sanction that serves deterrent or retributive
purposes no matter how slight those punitive effects may be. Defendant's reliance on
Hudson for this proposition is erroneous for several reasons. First, Hudson was decided
before Kurth Ranch. In other words, the Tenth Circuit reached its decision without the
benefit of knowing that the Supreme Court viewed Halper's solely punitive language as the
holding of its seminal double jeopardy case. The Hudson court also reached its conclusion
before Kurth Ranch narrowly classified Austin as an excessive fines case that has no relevant
application in the double jeopardy context.
Second, although Hudson uses the term "solely remedial" when describing its
punishment test, it does not use that term in the same way that Defendant uses the term. As
previously discussed, Defendant views the solely remedial test as establishing a bright line by
which a sanction is deemed punishment if it can in any way be considered to serve the

^Without explanation, the majority in Davis fails to discuss the fact that Kurth Ranch seriously undermines the
argument that Austin applies in the double jeopardy context at all. See Davis, 903 P.2d 940, 950 (Bench, J., dissenting,
points out that Kurth Ranch only supports the conclusion that Halper established a solely punitive type of test).
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purposes of deterrence or retribution. Hudson, on the other hand, clearly stated that for a
sanction to be deemed punishment it must be incapable of being considered a remedy. The
court noted, "We are careful to note that a determination that a sanction is at least in part
punishment requires that it must be explained as also serving as a deterrent or retribution,
not merely that it may be so explained." Id. at 540 (italics in original). Thus, Hudson
appears to merely restate the holding oiHalper.
This view is supported by the fact that the Hudson court gave an example of a case in
which although a sanction may arguably serve both remedial and punitive purposes it need
not be deemed as punishment. Citing United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263 (10th Cir.), in
which two defendants were charged with violating various regulations of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and were subsequently barred from participating
in HUD activities for a period of time, the Hudson court observed that debarment is a
legitimate remedial sanction that need not necessarily be defined as also being a deterrent or
retribution. The court stated, !fWhile Appellants 'may interpret debarment as punitive, and
indeed feel as though they have been punished, debarment constitutes the rough remedial
justice permissible as a prophylactic governmental action.'" Id. at 542 (quoting Bizzell, 921
F.2d at 267). This example not only reveals that Hudson does not stand for the bright line
solely remedial test that Defendant espouses, but it also suggests that not even the Hudson
court would view Defendant's driver's license suspension as punishment since that sanction is
analogous to the sanction of debarment which the court said "is remedial by definition." Id.
at 541.
Yet, even if Defendant's assertion that Halper established his version of the "solely
remedial" test were correct, his double jeopardy claim still must fail because the Utah
Supreme Court has expressly defined driver's license suspension sanctions as wholly remedial.
11

In Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 595 P.2d 1302 (1979), the court specifically
addressed the issue of whether a license revocation proceeding is criminal and punitive in
nature. The court stated,
The purpose of this administrative [license revocation] procedure is not to punish the
inebriated drivers; such persons are subject to separate criminal prosecution for the
purpose of punishment. The administrative revocation proceedings are to protect the
public, not to punish individual drivers.
Id. at 1305. Indeed, the Ballard court stated that the only purpose served by the sanction of
suspending an individual's driver's license is to protect motorists on public highways from a
presumptively dangerous driver. It is incidental that from the Defendant's perspective the
suspension of one's driving privileges feels like punishment. As the Halper court stated:
This is not to say that whether a sanction constitutes punishment must be made from
the defendant's perspective. On the contrary, our cases have acknowledged that for
the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment. Rather, we hold
merely that in determining whether a particular civil sanction constitutes criminal
punishment, it is the purpose actually served by the sanction in question, not the
underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the sanction, that must be
evaluated.
Id. at 447.
Consequently, whether this Court finds that the proper punishment test in the double
jeopardy context is a "solely punitive" or "solely remedial" test, Defendant's claim is without
merit because the Utah Supreme Court has defined license suspension as wholly remedial.
Unless and until the Utah Supreme Court overturns Ballard, all lower courts in Utah are
bound by the holding therein. See State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24-6 (Utah 1994)
(discussing importance of stare decisis and the heavy burden that must be met before
overturning precedent).
1)

The Legislature Has Articulated Clear Public Safety Reasons for
Imposing License Suspension Sanctions
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In addition to Ballard's conclusion that license suspension sanctions are remedial, the
Utah Legislature has also made it clear that license suspensions are designed to protect the
public safety by removing dangerous drivers from public highways. Indeed, everything about
the driver's license scheme is aimed at ensuring that only those motorists who can safely
drive a vehicle are issued a license.4 Suspending the license of a driver who has engaged in
such hazardous conduct as driving while under the influence of alcohol is one of a number of
reasonable means selected by the state legislature for protecting the public from unsafe
drivers. For instance, in 1993, the state legislature amended Utah's DUI and license
suspension laws. In so doing, the legislature passed U.C.A. § 53-3-222 (1994) and made it
clear that its purpose in requiring license suspensions for apparent DUI violations was not to
punish the driver, but to protect public safety:
The Legislature finds that a primary purpose of this title relating to suspension . . . of
a person's license or privilege to drive a motor vehicle for driving . . . while under the
influence of alcohol, . . . is protecting persons on the highways by quickly removing
from the highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
Id.5 If deterrence and retribution were the legislature's purpose for requiring suspension of
driving privileges for DUI violations, it would not have enacted the many elaborate
safeguards it has to ensure that those privileges were not reinstated until convicted DUI
offenders have taken significant steps to show that they are no longer a threat to the public

*For instance, U.C.A. § 53-3-206 (1994) requires the driver's license division to test each applicant's eyesight,
ability to read and understand highway signs, physical and mental abilities, and ability to exercise ordinary and
responsible control while driving a motor vehicle. Similarly, U.CA. § 53-3-208 authorizes the division to impose safety
restrictions on a licensee (e.g., requiring a licensee with vision problems to wear corrective eyeglasses while driving).
5

Defendant argues that because the state legislature cited public safety merely as a primary purpose of the
suspension sanction rather than the primary purpose, suspensions must also serve other purposes and "any other
purpose for the statute necessarily deters or punishes the defendant.M (Defendant's Brief at 11). Defendant clearly
places too much weight on the articles of "a" and "the*1 and mistakenly presumes that there must be other purposes in
enacting a statute. If the legislature intended to include deterrence or punishment in its list of purposes it could have
done so explicitly. Therefore, it is telling that the only purpose the legislature was able or willing to articulate focuses
on public safety concerns. Given the lack of ambiguity in the legislature's stated policy this Court should not concern
itself with what Defendant believes could have or should have been included in that policy.
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safety. See, e.g., U.C.A. § 41-6-44(B)(i) (requiring alcohol and drug dependency assessments,
education, treatment, and rehabilitation upon conviction of DUI); U.C.A. § 41-6-44(B)(iii)
(requiring certification from licensed alcohol or drug dependency facility before repeat DUI
offender can have driving privileges reinstated).
Nevertheless, Defendant asserts that license suspension serves at least in part to
punish him and cites the fact that the law imposes a 90 day suspension for the first violation
and imposes longer suspensions for subsequent violations as proof of that punitive purpose.
(Defendant's Brief at 9.) Rather than revealing the punitive nature of license suspension
sanctions, however, the increased period of suspension merely reflects the fact that a driver
who continues to violate the law proves him or herself to be a greater threat to the public
safety. Such a driver requires a longer period of suspension so that more extensive measures
may be taken to ensure that he or she has the ability to drive safely before his or her driving
privileges will be reinstated. Many other jurisdictions have held that the state has an
important interest in keeping its highways safe by removing drunken drivers from its roads
via summary suspension of a driver's license. See, e.g., People v. Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873,
879-82 (111. 1988); Ruge v. Kovach, 467 N.E.2d 673, 678-81 (Ind. 1984); Heddan v. Dirkswager,
336 N.W.2d 54, 59-63 (Minn. 1983); State v. Murray, 644 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. App. 4 Dist.
1994); Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 204-06 (Md. App. 1993); Butler v. Dept of Public Safety
& Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790, 795-97 (La. 1992); Barnes v. Tofany, 261 N.E.2d 617, 620 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1970). In this regard, the Vermont Supreme Court observed,
We note that no court has held that the suspension of a motor vehicle operator's
license is so punitive as to involve a criminal punishment for double jeopardy
purposes. The decisions prior to Halper held that license suspension is not a criminal
punishment invoking double jeopardy protection. The few decisions since Halper hold
similarly. In short, a "bright line" has developed because the nonpunitive purpose of
the license suspension is so clear and compelling. We see nothing in Halper that
induces us to cross that line.

044

State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 514 (Vt. 1992). It is clear, therefore, that license suspensions
are rationally related to valid remedial goals, which is all that Halper requires.
It should come as little surprise that numerous courts have held that license
suspensions do not violate double jeopardy protections when imposed in addition to criminal
prosecutions. See, e.g., Milner v. State, 1994 WL 740807 (Ala. Civ. App.) (rejecting double
jeopardy claim because Kurth Ranch has no application to Alabama's drug tax); State of
Nebraska v. Young, 1995 WL 104407 (Neb. App. March 1995) (noting that although the
Halper and Kurth Ranch decisions "justify revisiting this issue . . . . [those cases] do not
require abandonment of the reasoning set forth in" prior case law concerning driver's license
revocation); Ellis v. Pierce, 282 Cal. Rptr. 93 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1991) (rejecting defendant's
claim that driver's license suspension in addition to DUI prosecution constituted double
jeopardy because "a driver's license suspension . . . is not remedial in the same sense meant
by the Halper decision"); State v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510 (Vt. 1992) (rejecting defendant's claim
that driver's license suspension in addition to criminal prosecution constituted double
jeopardy because "the decisions prior to Halper held that license suspension is not a criminal
punishment involving double jeopardy protection . . . [and] we see nothing in Halper that
induces us to cross that line"); State v. Murray, 644 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1994)
(noting that because the primary purpose of a driver's license suspension for DUI "is to
provide an administrative remedy for public protection, . . . a double jeopardy prohibition
does not arise"); Johnson v. State, 622 A.2d 199, 204-06 (Md. App. 1993) (holding that the
purpose of license suspension is to protect public safety and that the punitive effect was
incidental and did not amount to a punishment as envisioned in Halper); Butler v. Dept of
Public Safety & Corrections, 609 So. 2d 790, 795-97 (La. 1992) (holding that license suspension
does not amount to a second punishment for the same offense because its "primary effect is
15

remedial; it removes those drivers from our state highways who have proven to be reckless or
hazardous").
Indeed, for courts to hold otherwise would be to suggest that the United States
Supreme Court intended to diminish the government's ability to protect public safety through
regulation of dangerous drivers. Given the many ways in which the conduct of individuals
can legitimately be regulated through civil and criminal sanctions, it is untenable to argue
that the Court intended such a result.6 Therefore, because the suspension of Defendant's
driver's license in this case is rationally related to the remedial goal of protecting the public
from unsafe drivers, it is not punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause and Defendant's
claim is without merit.

2)

Driving on Public Highways Is a Privilege Not a Right, and Such a
Privilege Is Revocable for Public Safety Reasons

Another important reason why suspension of Defendant's driver's license is not
punishment is that no property right is being taken away from him. The State's granting of a
driver's license was never meant to create a property interest or otherwise vest its possessor
with a right of any sort, but has been clearly identified as a privilege that carries with it a
number of responsibilities, conditions, and restrictions. For instance, U.C.A. § 53-3-102(16)
defines "license" as, "[T]he privilege to drive a motor vehicle." Similarly, U.C.A. § 53-3-

In fact, misconduct often gives rise to both regulatory sanctions and criminal charges. For instance, doctors,
lawyers, and other professionals can be criminally prosecuted for illegal acts in addition to having their licenses to
practice revoked. Courts addressing professional regulatory issues have recognized that Halper's punishment analysis
does not mandate the finding of a double jeopardy violation in that context. See, e.g., United States v. BizzelU 921 F.2d
263, 266 (10th Cir. 1990) (suspension of real estate brokers participation in HUD programs was not punishment under
Halper but was necessary regulatory means of protecting the integrity of public HUD program); Manocchio v.
Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1992) (exclusion for Medicare programs for conduct giving rise to criminal
charges was remedial under Halper); Chukwurah v. United States, 813 F.Supp. 161, 167 (D.C.N.Y. 1993) (deportation
proceedings do not constitute second prosecution or result in multiple punishments but was driven by concerns for
national interest rather than a desire to punish expelled aliens).
1*

102(25) defines "suspension" as, "[The] temporary withdrawal by action of the division of a
licensee's privilege to drive a motor vehicle." Therefore, it is a privilege rather than a right to
possess a driver's license, and such a privilege can be withdrawn by its grantor for a variety of
important public safety. In fact, state law authorizes the Division of Driver's Licenses to
immediately suspend one's driving privileges without a hearing in some circumstances. See
U.CA. § 53-3-221 (1994).
The Double Jeopardy Clause is a shield to protect criminal defendants from
overbearing government prosecutions. There are no such overbearing government
prosecutions in this case for the Defendant to be protected against. This important
constitutional protection was never intended to provide a loophole through which such
dangerous illegal activity as driving under the influence of alcohol could continue
unpunished. likewise, it defies reason to suggest that the government must choose between
suspending a dangerous driver's driving privileges or criminally prosecuting that person for
committing a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws. Accordingly, license suspensions do
not constitute a second punishment for a single offense because they are designed to protect
the public safety, not to punish individual drivers. While individual drivers may feel the sting
of punishment, that sting is merely incidental to the advancement of the compelling public
safety consideration of keeping hazardous drivers off public highways.
In sum, a driver's license suspension can be considered punishment only if its sole
purpose is to exact punishment against the Defendant and it is not rationally related to the
government's remedial objectives. Therefore, the Defendant's double jeopardy claim fails in
the present case under the Halper analysis because driving privilege suspensions are designed
to protect public safety and are, under the Utah Supreme Court's controlling precedent,
wholly remedial. Indeed, the clear and compelling purpose of a license suspension for DUI
17

is to protect the safety of the public by removing dangerous drivers from public highways.
This Court should, therefore, deny the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the City urges this Court to deny the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.
Dated this

u

_ day of December, 1995.

VERNON F. ROMNEY / 7
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF
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